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Non-Technical Summary
A sizeable literature reports that financial market analysts and forecasters herd for repu-
tational reasons (See e.g. Devenow and Welch (1996) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for
surveys). As an example, Lamont (2002) argues that if forecasters are“punished”for being
wrong, forecasters could have an incentive to mimic other forecasters, i.e. to herd. Using
new data from a large survey of professional forecasters’ expectations about stock market
movements, we find strong evidence that the expected average of all forecasters’ forecasts
(the expected consensus forecast) influences an individual forecaster’s own forecast.
This looks like herding. In our survey, forecasters do not herd for reputational reasons,
however. Instead of herding, we suggest that forecasters form higher-order expectations
in the spirit of Keynes (1936) who compared the setting of prices in financial markets
with a newspaper beauty contest. In this contest, competitors were invited to pick the
six prettiest faces from among one hundred photographs. The winner of the contest
was the person whose choice most closely corresponded to the average preference of all
competitors. Hence, a competitor should not only pick the prettiest faces, but those he
thought the other competitors would also view as the prettiest, and – at the same time –
take into account that all other competitors would form expectations in a similar manner.
Keynes’ idea was that financial markets work in this way, too.
Keynes’ description of asset pricing as a beauty contest has recently received renewed
attention in the theoretical literature examining the theoretical implications of higher-
order expectations for asset prices (e.g. Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2006, 2009), Nimark (2007), Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009), and
Makarov and Rytchkov (2008)). We follow up on those papers by providing some first
empirical evidence on this form of expectation formation in this paper.
Our first result is that forecasters are influenced by the expected consensus forecast. This
basic result is highly statistically significant, remains significant when adding different
kinds of control variables, shows up in all our robustness tests, and, most importantly, is
also of substantial economic significance. Finding that forecasters are influenced by the
consensus forecast in this dataset of German forecasters both confirms findings from the
U.S. to other countries, and, at the same time, thereby provide“out-of-sample”evidence on
the results from the U.S. studies, as reported in, e.g., Graham (1999), Welch (2000), and
Lamont (2002). We find that young forecasters and portfolio managers, who in previous
studies have been reported to be those who in particular herd, rely more on the expected
consensus forecasts than other forecasters. Given that forecasters have no incentive to
herd in our study, we conclude that our results indicate that the incorporation of the
expected consensus forecast into individual forecasts is most likely due to higher-order
expectations.
Zusammenfassung (Non-Technical Summary in German)
Eine umfangreiche Literatur findet emprische Belege, dass Finanzmarktanalysten und
Prognostiker aus Reputationsgru¨nden zu Herdenverhalten neigen (vgl. Devenow and
Welch (1996) sowie Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) fu¨r U¨berblicksartikel). So weist unter an-
derem Lamont (2002) darauf hin, dass Finanzmarktanalysten – sofern sie durch ihre Fehl-
prognosen Nachteile auf Grund von Reputationsverlusten erleiden – einen expliziten An-
reiz dazu haben, das Verhalten anderer Prognostiker zu imitieren. Dieses Pha¨nomen wird
typischerweise als Herdenverhalten bezeichnet. Unter Verwendung eines neuen Mikro-
datensatzes aus einer umfassenden Umfrage unter professionellen Finanzmarktprognos-
tikern zu deren ku¨nftigen Aktienmarkterwartungen, finden wir starke Evidenz dafu¨r,
dass der erwartete Durchschnitt der Prognosen aller Prognostiker (d.h. die erwartete
Konsensus-Prognose) einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die individuelle Prognose der einzelnen
Prognostikers aufweist.
Dieses Resultat legt als Interpretation Herdenverhalten nahe. Ein Merkmal unseres Daten-
satzes ist jedoch, dass bei den befragten Prognostikern keinerlei Gru¨nde fu¨r Herdenver-
halten aus Reputationsgesichtspunkten gegeben sind. An Stelle von Herdenverhalten,
fu¨hren wir daher das empirisch beobachtete Verhalten der Prognostiker auf die Bildung so
genannter Erwartungen ho¨herer Ordnung (higher-order expectations) zuru¨ck. Erwartun-
gen ho¨herer Ordnung gehen auf Keynes (1936) zuru¨ck, welcher die Preisbildung auf Fi-
nanzma¨rkten mit einem seinerzeit typischen Scho¨nheitswettbewerb (beauty contest) in
Zeitungen verglich. In diesem Wettbewerb wurden die Teilnehmer aufgefordert, aus hun-
dert Fotos die sechs hu¨bschesten Gesichter auszuwa¨hlen. Der Gewinner des Wettbewerbs
war derjenige dessen Wahl am ehesten mit der Durchschnittspra¨ferenz der anderen Teil-
nehmer u¨bereinstimmte. Demnach war es fu¨r den einzelnen Teilnehmer nicht optimal, das
aus seiner Sicht hu¨bscheste Gesicht zu wa¨hlen, sondern dasjenige, von welchem er davon
ausging, dass auch die anderen Teilnehmer es als das hu¨bscheste ansehen wu¨rden. Dabei
musste er beachten, dass die anderen Teilnehmer auf die gleiche Art und Weise Erwartun-
gen bilden wu¨rden. Keynes war der erste, der diese Idee eines Scho¨nheitswettbewerbs auf
die Preisbildung auf Finanzma¨rkten u¨bertrug.
Die Erkla¨rung der Bildung von Vermo¨genspreisen auf Basis der von Keynes beschriebenen
Mechanismen eines Scho¨nheitswettbewerbs hat ku¨rzlich in der theoretischen Literatur eine
erneuerte Aufmerksamkeit erfahren (z.B. Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2006, 2009), Nimark (2007), Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009), and
Makarov and Rytchkov (2008)). Wir folgen diesen Arbeiten, indem wir in dieser Studie
erste empirische Evidenz zu dieser Form der Erwartungsbildung vorlegen.
Unser erstes Resultat ist, dass die Finanzmarktprognostiker in unserer Stichprobe durch
die erwartete Konsenus-Prognose beeinflusst werden. Dieses Resultat ist statistisch hoch
signifikant, bleibt signifikant, wenn fu¨r eine Reihe weiterer Einflussfaktoren auf die Aktien-
markterwartung kontrolliert wird, zeigt sich in allen Robustheitstests und ist ebenfalls,
was von besonderer Bedeutung ist, von substanzieller o¨knomischer Signifikanz. Das Re-
sultat, dass Prognostiker durch den Konsensus beeinflusst werden, unterstu¨tzt bisherige
Resultate fu¨r die USA (vgl. u.a. Graham (1999), Welch (2000), and Lamont (2002))
und liefert auf diese Weise “out-of-sample” Evidenz. Ein weiteres zentrales Resultat ist,
dass sich besonders junge Prognostiker sowie Portfolio Manager versta¨rkt am erwarteten
Konsensus orientieren. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Prognostiker in unserem Daten-
satz keinen Anreiz zu Herdenverhalten aus Reputationsgesichtspunkten haben, fu¨hren wir
unsere Resultate hinsichtlich der Bedeutung des erwarteten Konsensus fu¨r die Individu-
alprognosen auf die Bildung von Erwartungen ho¨herer Ordnung zuru¨ck.
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Higher-Order Beliefs among Professional Stock
Market Forecasters: Some first Empirical Tests
Abstract
A sizeable literature reports that financial market analysts and forecasters herd
for reputational reasons. Using new data from a large survey of professional fore-
casters’ expectations about stock market movements, we find strong evidence that
the expected average of all forecasters’ forecasts (the expected consensus forecast)
influences an individual forecaster’s own forecast. This looks like herding. In our
survey, forecasters do not herd for reputational reasons, however. Instead of herding,
we suggest that forecasters form higher-order expectations in the spirit of Keynes
(1936). We find that young forecasters and portfolio managers, who in previous
studies have been reported to be those who in particular herd, rely more on the
expected consensus forecasts than other forecasters. Given that forecasters have
no incentive to herd in our study, we conclude that our results indicate that the
incorporation of the expected consensus forecast into individual forecasts is most
likely due to higher-order expectations.
JEL-Classification: G10, G15, G17
Keywords: Higher-Order Expectations, Stock Market Forecasts, Forecaster Heterogeneity
1 Introduction
Herding in financial markets occurs when individual market participants bias their forecast
away from their best, or unbiased, estimate of future outcomes towards the consensus
expectation from the previous period. The literature on herding among financial analysts
and forecasters “has focused on herding for rational reputational reasons“ (Hirshleifer and
Teoh, 2003, p. 45). As an example, Lamont (2002) argues that if forecasters are“punished”
for being wrong, forecasters could have an incentive to mimic other forecasters, i.e. to
herd.1
The first thing we do in this paper is to use a new dataset to test whether the average (or
consensus) expectation matters for the expectations individual market forecasters form.
We find strong and robust evidence that this is indeed the case. On the face of it, this
looks very much like herding for reputational reasons.
However, an interesting feature of the data we use, is that we can a priori rule out
herding for reputational reasons. The reason for this is that the individual forecasts of
the forecasters in our survey are not published – it is only the consensus forecast that
is published (we describe the data in more detail below). This particular feature of the
data eliminates herding arising from reputational concerns, as the forecast error of the
individual forecaster cannot per definition have any effect on his career or reputation, as
it simply cannot be evaluated by outside observers whether the forecaster made a good or
a bad forecast.2 Hence, even if it looks like herding, we know that it is not herding. We
think this provides an interesting new dimension to the empirical literature on herding in
financial markets.
If the consensus expectation matters for the formation of individual expectations, but
it cannot be because of herding by construction of our data, why does the consensus
matter then? The hypothesis we pursue in this paper is that investors form higher-order
1Stickel (1992), Graham (1999), Welch (2000), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), and Ashiya and
Doi (2001) all provide evidence indicating that analysts or forecasters herd for reputational reasons. For
surveys, see Devenow and Welch (1996) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003).
2Similarly, since individual forecasts are not published, we can also rule out explanations based on
information cascades (e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).
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expectations.
Keynes (1936) was the first to introduce higher-order expectations as a description of
the way expectations are formed in financial markets. It makes sense to briefly review
Keynes’ idea before we proceed. Keynes (1936) compared the setting of prices in financial
markets with a newspaper beauty contest. In the contest, competitors were invited to pick
the six prettiest faces from among one hundred photographs. The winner of the contest
was the person whose choice most closely corresponded to the average preference of all
competitors. Hence, a competitor should not only pick the prettiest faces, but those he
thought the other competitors would also view as the prettiest. At the same time, the
competitor should take into account that all other competitors would form expectations
in a similar manner. Keynes’ idea was that financial markets work in this way, too: An
investor should not only buy the financial assets he expects to perform well. Instead,
the investor should buy those assets he expects the other investors will choose to buy, at
the same time taking into account that the other investors will act in a similar way, i.e.
that they all try to guess what the other investors try to guess about the other investors.
Keynes dubbed this form of expectation formation “higher-order expectations”.
In Keynes’ beauty contest, the consensus expectation does not contain new information
about fundamentals: all competitors can see all faces, i.e. no new information about
fundamentals (the pictures) is revealed if investors see the consensus expectation. In
financial markets it might be, however, that forecasters look at the consensus because they
believe that other forecasters have information about future outcomes that the individual
forecaster does not have. In other words, it could also be that forecasters believe that
the average forecast summarizes other forecasters’ otherwise dispersed private informative
signals (i.e. the average forecast aggregates other forecasters’ private information) about
an asset’s fundamental value. In this case, a reliance on consensus expectations would
arise because forecasters update their beliefs with new information.
Hence, we need to distinguish between higher-order expectations and standard updating
of beliefs with new relevant information. Following up on Keynes’ idea, the identifying
assumption we use to empirically distinguish between higher-order expectations and stan-
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dard rational updating of beliefs is that standard rational updating of beliefs occurs when
forecasters believe that the other forecasters receive informative signals about final out-
comes that are different from the signals that the individual forecasters see (i.e. that the
individual forecasters believe that the consensus expectation contains information about,
as in our case, the fundamental value of the stock market). On the other hand, we say that
investors form higher-order expectations when the forecasters do not necessarily believe
that the signals that the other forecasters receive are informative, but they believe that
the forecasts of the other forecasters nevertheless influence outcomes.
We provide two tests that indicate that our finding that an individual forecaster forms
expectations with an eye towards the consensus forecast is due to the formation of higher-
order expectations. In these tests we evaluate whether those forecasters who have been
found to be more prone to herding in earlier studies also rely more on the consensus
expectation when forming their own expectation in this data set. In particular, we evaluate
whether portfolio managers and/or young forecasters rely more on the consensus than
other forecasters.3
To test hypotheses such as those just outlined above, good (micro-)data are required. The
data we use come from a survey conducted among professional German forecasters. The
main advantage of these data is that they do not reveal the individual forecasts of the
forecasters – only the consensus expectation is made public. An additional advantage of
the data is that all forecasters are closely tracked, as are their background characteristics,
such as the age of the forecaster, his level of education, his current job function, etc. In
addition, the survey keeps the forecast of a forecaster even after the forecaster has left the
survey, i.e. there is no survivorship bias in our data.4 The data spans the period from
December 1991 to October 2008. All in all, over the whole sample period, we have 453
3To be precise: If it is rational to incorporate the consensus expectation because it affects asset prices,
all investors should do so. And, indeed, we also find that investors on average incorporate the consensus
expectation. Our identifying assumption, though, is that investors should look at the consensus per se,
if it is higher-order expectations. Consequently, we see if there are groups of investors who we a priori
expect to look at the consensus per se. If these investors incorporate the consensus expectation even
more, we interpret this as a sign of higher-order expectations.
4These features of our data make them advantageous compared to, e.g., the Survey of Professional
Forecasters or the Livingston Survey (both of which are U.S. surveys). For instance, there are cases
in these U.S. data where the identification code for an investment bank, say, stays constant over time
regardless of who the actual forecaster is.
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forecasters.
In our survey, respondents are asked to indicate whether they expect the prices on the U.S.
and the German equity market to increase (”1”), decrease (”−1”), or remain unchanged (”0
”) over the next six months. The respondents are also asked about their expectations for
the U.K., French, Italian, and Japanese stock markets. We focus on the expectations for
the U.S. and the home (the German) markets in the main part of the paper and present
results for the other countries as robustness checks. As we have a panel of ordered choices
made by each forecaster (positive, negative, or unchanged stock market), we estimate
random parameters ordered panel logit models. In our basic implementation, we use the
lagged average forecast as our estimate of the expected average forecast. It is important to
note here that when the forecasters make their forecast for the next period, last period’s
average forecast is known to all forecasters.
We now explain our empirical findings. Our first result is that forecasters are influenced
by the expected consensus forecast. This basic result is highly statistically significant,
remains significant when adding different kinds of control variables, shows up in all our
robustness tests, and, most importantly, is also of substantial economic significance. In
terms of economic importance, for instance, we find that when the average forecast in-
creases by two standard deviations, i.e. when the average forecaster becomes more opti-
mistic with respect to the performance of the U.S. stock market, an individual forecaster
becomes 13.84 percentage point more positive towards the U.S. stock market. Given that
the unconditional probability of an “up”-forecast is 38.90 percent, the marginal effect of
13.84 percentage points is indeed economically significant. Finding that forecasters are
influenced by the consensus forecast in this dataset of German forecasters both confirms
findings from the U.S. to other countries, and, at the same time, thereby provide “out-of-
sample” evidence on the results from the U.S. studies, as reported in, e.g., Graham (1999),
Welch (2000), and Lamont (2002).
Our next test is based on a sorting of forecasters into “relative forecasters”, i.e. forecasters
whose pay is related to their outperformance relative to a market benchmark, such as
portfolio managers, and forecasters whose pay is not (“absolute forecasters”) but rather
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depends on absolute success. When portfolio managers’ pay is related to their outperfor-
mance relative to a market benchmark, portfolio managers have a clear incentive to look
more towards the forecasts of other forecasters when forming their own forecast, regard-
less of whether the average forecast contains informative signals about the fundamental
value of asset prices or not. We find strong evidence that the impact of consensus beliefs
on individual beliefs is higher (about 10% higher) if a forecaster is a “relative” forecaster,
compared to the forecasters in our control group. In contrast being in the group of “ab-
solute forecasters” decreases the impact of consensus beliefs by about 20%. Given that
those forecasters whose pay is related to their relative outperformance do not look at
the expected consensus forecast because they want to be close to the average forecast
for reputational or career concerns, as argued above, we interpret this as evidence that
they look at the consensus expectation because they think that the consensus matters for
asset prices per se, i.e. regardless of whether or not it contains fundamental information.
Forecaster who are evaluated in terms of absolute success by contrast should rely more on
fundamental information and our results do indeed suggest that this group of forecasters
relies less on consensus expectations.
The final test we conduct is based on the empirical finding in the literature that younger
finance professionals tend to follow market trends and general market consensus (i.e. herd)
when they trade (e.g. List, 2003; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair,
2007; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). Again, there is no reason for herding in our survey.
Hence, if the young traders look towards the expected consensus, it is not because they
fear that it will have consequences for their career if they are wrong. Rather, they think
that the consensus expectation matters for asset prices, even if it does not necessarily
contain new fundamental information about asset prices. We find clear evidence that
young and less experienced forecasters incorporate the expected consensus forecast into
their own forecast to a significantly larger extent than older forecasters.
Related literature. Keynes’ description of asset pricing as a beauty contest has re-
cently received renewed attention in the theoretical literature: Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006, 2009), Nimark (2007), Banerjee, Kaniel, and
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Kremer (2009), and Makarov and Rytchkov (2008) all examine the theoretical implications
of higher-order expectations for asset prices. We follow up on those papers by providing
some first empirical evidence in this paper.
Even if we have no knowledge of studies that directly test for higher-order expectations
within a sample of individual market participants or finance professionals, experiments
or simulations have been used to evaluate whether individuals form higher-order beliefs.
Bosch-Dome`nech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002) for example find that there is
evidence for the existence of higher-order expectations among students and readers of
certain news magazines. Also, Biais and Bossaerts (1998) analytically investigate the
effect of differences in beliefs related to beauty contests on asset prices and trading volume
and provide simulation results.
Moreover, the papers that analyze the theoretical implications of higher-order expectations
often contain interesting motivating verbal discussions of instances where higher-order
beliefs seem to have played a role. For instance, Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin
(2004) discuss how the existence of one big trader, who is not necessarily better informed
than the other traders, can increase the likelihood of a currency attack. Similarly, Morris
and Shin (2005) discuss how a central bank can help coordinating the beliefs of the agents
in the market by publishing their own forecasts. But again, these discussions contain no
direct tests for higher-order beliefs – something we attempt to provide in this paper.
There is a large literature that tests whether financial market participants or forecasters
herd. Prominent empirical papers in this area include Stickel (1992), Graham (1999),
Welch (2000), Lamont (2002), and Ashiya and Doi (2001) who find evidence of herding,
and Zitzewitz (2001) and Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoatic (2006), who find that
analysts do not herd. Generally, these papers deal with herding for reputational reasons.
In contrast, we employ a dataset that is characterized by the absence of reputational
concerns. This allows us to discard herding as a reason for why forecasters look at the
expected consensus forecast when forming their own forecast.
6
Structure of paper. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, we briefly sketch the main theoretical implication of higher-order expectations
and the main empirical hypothesis that we test. In section 3, we describe the data we use
to test our hypotheses and in section 4 we lay out our empirical procedure. Sections 5
and 6 contain the main results. Section 7 contains robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical Motivation
Higher-order expectations imply that assets are priced under average market expectations
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2009):
Pt = ρEt[Xt+1] (1)
where ρ is a discount factor, Pt denotes the time t price of an asset and E[·] ≡
∫
i
Ei[·]di
denotes the average market expectation regarding the future total payoff Xt+1 of an asset.
The main difference compared with the standard approach is the use of the average
market expectation operator which need not equal each individual’s expectation Ei[·] when
investors are heterogeneous. The point about heterogeneity here is that individuals have
to start thinking about the aggregate expectation of the market and not only about their
own expectation, since the asset price is determined by these aggregate beliefs. In such
situations, higher-order beliefs can have a significant impact on asset prices in equilibrium.
Most importantly, higher-order expectations drive a wedge between the price of the asset
in a world of identical agents and the price of the asset in a world with heterogeneous
agents and expectations (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2009). The reason for this is that
when information is heterogeneous, the law of iterated expectations does no longer hold
for average expectations.5 Higher-order expectations also lead to an excessive reaction of
asset prices to public information (Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006).6
5“It is not the case that the average expectation today of the average expectation tomorrow of future
payoffs is equal to the average expectation of future payoffs.”, Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006, p. 720).
6More generally, higher-order beliefs play a role under short-sale constraints where the asset price
exceeds its fundamental value due to an implicit option to sell the asset to an investor with a higher
private valuation in the future (see e.g. Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite, 1993; Scheinkman and Xiong,
2003). Differences in beliefs, such as higher-order expectations affect the value of that option. However,
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It is clear from the above equation that higher-order beliefs imply that:
Eit[Pt+1] = Eit
[
ρEt+1(Xt+2)
]
(2)
so that an individual forecaster i has to rely on consensus expectations to make up his
individual forecast. Neglecting the information contained in consensus expectations would
mean to ignore an important determinant of asset prices. The point of departure of our
paper is therefore a test of whether consensus expectations, i.e. E[X], are a significant
determinant of individual expectations Ei[P ]. Evidence of such a relationship would imply
that higher-order beliefs may be at work. We provide strong statistical evidence in favor
of such a relationship in the remainder of this paper.7
After having verified that E[X] is an important determinant of Ei[P ], we make use of the
richness of our data to conduct even more stringent tests of whether it really is higher-
order expectations that are at play. In particular, we hypothesize that there are certain
groups of investors (to be detailed below) who have a larger incentive per se to rely on
E[X] when forming their own forecasts. Given that we find that these groups of investors
in fact do put more weight on the average expectation, we interpret this as suggesting
that individual forecasters form higher-order expectations.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes our data and provides descriptive statistics. First we describe the
general data set and provide details of our cross-section of forecasts. We then move on to
describe consensus stock market expectations for our sample countries.
papers in this line of literature do not explicitly focus on the effect of pure higher-order expectations. In
addition, there are of course other issues with investor heterogeneity and learning in financial markets
which we do not deal with in this paper. A recent survey of work in this field is provided by Pastor and
Veronesi (2009).
7Eq. (2) can be written in a number of alternative ways. In our main empirical analysis, we thus do
not test Eq. (2) directly but rather test for a more general relation between individual expectations and
expected consensus expectations.
8
3.1 General Features of the Data
Our data come from a monthly survey of the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW) which is one of the largest economic research institutes in Germany. At the
beginning of each month, approximately 350 professional forecasters from large German
banks, institutional investors, or treasury departments of large corporations are asked
whether they expect a specific stock market to go “up”, “down”, or remain “unchanged”
over the next six months. Hence, we are dealing with qualitative data. The respondents
are asked about their directional forecast of aggregate stock market indices in the U.S.,
Germany, U.K., France, Italy, and Japan. The respondents generally reply before the
second Tuesday of a given month, i.e. the individual forecasts are not spread out over
the whole month. In addition, when the forecasts are made for the following month, last
month’s average expectation for this month is well-known to all forecasters since consensus
expectations are made public on the second Tuesday of a month.8 On the other hand, the
forecasts of the individual forecasters are not made public and, hence, cannot be evaluated
by any outside observers. This last feature of the data is crucial for our tests of higher-
order expectations, as it eliminates concerns about herding for reputational reasons.
Forecasts are collected in a micro-panel of forecasters and data in this study are available
from December 1991 (the start of the survey) to October 2008. Therefore, our sample
spans the major bull and bear markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s as well as the
current 2007/2008 market meltdown.
Our dataset includes individual stock market forecasts for each forecaster and their cor-
responding socio-economic background characteristics. The panel of forecasters has been
quite stable over time with relatively few exits and new entries. Our sample fortunately
includes data for all forecasters even if some forecasters have left the panel at some point
in time during the sample period. There are thus no biases arising from survivorship
issues. Furthermore, the panel generically identifies individuals and not institutions. A
forecaster who changes his job and moves from one bank to another, for example, keeps
8The consensus expectation (i.e. the average forecast) is actually followed closely in Germany and
gets quite some attention in the financial news media.
9
his identifying code so that our panel is not distorted by these issues. This is a major
advantage over other panels (such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters) where it is
often less clear whether a specific “forecaster” actually remains the same over time.
3.2 Individual Forecasters
What kind of forecasters are we dealing with in this study? To answer this question,
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the socio-economic background characteristics
of the 453 individual forecasters in our (unbalanced) panel data set.9
Gender is a dummy variable equal to one for male forecasters and zero otherwise. Our
sample mainly consists of men which account for more than 90% of all individuals. Age is
measured in years and the table shows that our average forecaster is in his mid-forties and
that we also have very young (minimum age of 27 years) and old (up to 70 years) fore-
casters.10 Moreover, we have information about the professional experience of forecasters
which is broken down into general work experience (on any full-time job) and experience
relating to a specialization in financial markets. However, the latter two do not differ
much and our average forecaster has a significant experience of about 20 years in the
financial sector. Notice that a treasurer of an industrial firm, for instance, is character-
ized as having experience in financial markets, as a treasurer also manages financial risks
(interest rate, exchange rate risk etc.). This last point becomes important later in the
paper when we split forecasters into different groups based on their current job functions.
Table 1 about here
Turning to the educational background we see that our sample mostly consists of individ-
uals having a training in economics or business (labeled ”economics education” here).11
9On average, approximately 300 forecasters participate in the survey each month. Our sample, how-
ever, is smaller, since background characteristics are not available for each single forecaster.
10We have taken the age variable as of 2008 to make forecasters comparable.
11This includes any degree in Economics and Business Administration, such as Bachelor and Master
degrees in Business, Finance, Economics, etc.
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Furthermore, about 77% have a university degree and almost 10% have completed a doc-
toral degree. We are thus dealing with a well-trained and highly educated sample of
forecasters.
3.3 Consensus Stock Market Expectations
Consensus stock market expectations in month t are calculated by the balance statistic
(share of ”up” minus ”down” forecasts in percent) based on all individual forecasts in
month t. Therefore, our consensus expectations are bound between minus and plus one
by constructions. Figure 1 shows time-series plots of consensus expectations. It can
be seen that consensus forecasts are quite variable, especially during some sharp short-
term declines in consensus forecasts e.g. in March – May 1998, February – March 2000,
or December 2007 – February 2008. It can also be seen that there are essentially two
regimes during our sample, one from 1991 – 2001 where consensus expectations tend to
rise and a second regime from 2002 – 2008 where consensus expectations are falling. We
will look at these two regimes more closely in the robustness section.
Figure 1 about here
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for consensus stock market forecasts for the six coun-
tries in our sample. As in Strong and Xu (2003), there is a clear tendency for forecasters
to be more optimistic for their home (the German) equity market: The average, median,
minimum and maximum consensus forecasts are largest for the German market.12 Also
note that the volatility of consensus expectations is lowest for the home market as in
Strong and Xu (2003). Therefore, forecasters are most optimistic for their home market
and they do not adjust their forecasts as much as for other countries.
Table 2 also shows first order autocorrelation coefficients (ρ−1) and results from unit-root
tests. Autocorrelations are very high so that consensus expectations are persistent, but
12Strong and Xu (2003) use the Merrill Lynch survey of professional investors.
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unit-root tests suggest that the time-series of consensus forecasts are stationary. The
ADF test suggests stationarity at least at the 10% level for all six countries whereas more
powerful panel unit root tests (shown in the last two rows in the table) clearly reject the
null of a unit-root.13
Table 2 about here
In an Appendix that is available on our webpages, we show that there is a positive
correlation between all six consensus stock market forecasts. Some of these correlations
(e.g. France/US, Japan/US) are quite low, however, so that there is quite some cross-
country variation in stock market expectations (which is also evident from Figure 1). In
the Webappendix, we also provide transition probabilities. We find that expectations are
quite persistent, as also indicated by the first-order autocorrelations and the unit root
tests in Table 1. For example, there is 62% probability that a “down” forecast for the U.S.
in month t is followed by “down” forecast in month t+ 1 but only a 12% chance that the
forecast in t+ 1 will be “up”.
In the following, we will focus on the results we get for the U.S. and the German stock
market forecasts. Choosing the U.S. and Germany actually covers most information in
our sample as there are tight relationships between the U.S. and U.K. forecasts and the
forecasts for Germany, France, and Italy, respectively. To provide the full picture also,
though, we discuss results for the other countries in the robustness section.
13The high persistence makes sense from an economic perspective, since forecasts are six months ahead
and thus overlap at our monthly frequency. Stationarity also seems reasonable, since balance statistics
are bound between -1 and +1 by construction.
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4 Empirical Implementation
This section details our estimation procedure. We are principally interested in regressions
in the general form of:
e∗i,t = αi + E[et]θi + x′i,tβ + +e∗t−1,iγ + εi,t (3)
where e∗ is the stock market return forecast of forecaster i (i = 1, ..., N) at time t (t =
0, ..., Ti), E[et] is the expected consensus expectation for period t, and x is a vector of
control variables which is possibly individual-specific. We focus our attention on the
estimate of θi which quantifies the degree to which individual forecasts are influenced by
movements in expected consensus expectations. In our empirical applications below, we
will allow for heterogeneity across forecasters by making both the intercept αi and the
slope coefficient θi individual-specific, i.e. we allow for cross-sectional randomness in these
parameters.
Unfortunately, direct estimation of this regression by OLS is not possible due to the qual-
itative nature of our data (we do not observe the quantitative return forecast e∗i,t but only
the qualitative analogue), forecaster heterogeneity (via αi and θi), and the need to include
lagged dependent variables (e∗i,t−1) as controls in several of our regression specifications.
Our empirical strategy takes these important features of our data into account. First, our
data are discrete and ordered so that we resort to ordered choice models. Second, we have
to deal with biases arising from lagged variables entering a panel regression specification
which allows for cross-sectional heterogeneity. We detail our econometric approach of
tackling these challenges below and in the Appendix.
4.1 Ordered Choice Approach
Since our data consist of individual qualitative stock market forecasts, we make use
of ordered choice regression models. Ordered choice models are well-known in finance
(e.g. Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1992) and our implementation of the methodology is
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straightforward. For this reason, the basic points will only be discussed briefly.
Ordered choice models are based on the idea that an observed variable (e – qualitative
stock forecasts) is related to the underlying but unobserved variable (e∗ – quantitative
stock market expectations) in the following way:
e = −1 if e∗ ≤ 0,
= 0 if 0 < e∗ ≤ µ1,
= 1 if µ1 < e
∗
where e = −1, 0, 1 correspond to forecasts of “down”, “unchanged”, and “up”, respectively,
and µ1 is a threshold parameter to be estimated along with all other regression parameters
of the model. If one assumes that  in a regression of the latent variable e∗ on a set of
regressors e∗ = x′β+ has a logistic distribution, then the probability of observing outcome
j (j = −1, 0, 1) is given by Pr[e = −1] = L(−x′β), Pr[e = 0] = L(µ1 − x′β) − L(−x′β),
and Pr[e = 1] = 1 − L(µ1 − x′β) where L is the cumulative distribution function of the
logistic distribution. Since all probabilities have to be positive, we also have to impose
the restriction µ1 > 0. The formulation here only estimates one cut-off parameter (µ1)
such that the intercept in the ordered logit regression is identified.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity
As indicated in Eq. (3) above, we allow the intercept αi and slope coefficient θi to be
random across forecasters. This specification allows us to take heterogeneity across fore-
casters into account since it cannot be expected that all forecasters share the same average
level of optimism/pessimism (via α) or the same reliance on consensus expectations (via
θ). Our random parameters model directly quantifies the degree to which individual
forecasters differ in these dimensions.
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In its simplest form, we employ the following specification for cross-sectional randomness:αi
θi
 =
α
θ
+
σα 0
0 σθ
vαi
vθi
 (4)
where vji ∼ N (0, 1) are normally distributed and uncorrelated with each other. This
formulation allows for an estimation of the overall (or average) level of optimism (via α)
and reliance on consensus expectations (via θ) while also quantifying the dispersion across
forecasters (via σα and σθ). It is important to note, however, that randomness is purely
cross-sectional (hence the i subscript) and not over time.
In the empirical applications below, we will also estimate regressions with more random
parameters, e.g. interaction terms of consensus expectations with other conditioning
variables. In these cases, the general structure of cross-sectional heterogeneity is directly
analogous to the two-parameter case shown above and reads:
θi = θ + Λvi (5)
where θi and θ now denote column vectors (including the intercept αi) and Λ is a diagonal
matrix collecting the cross-sectional dispersion parameters (e.g. σα and σθ in the above
case). Throughout the paper, we only consider the case of uncorrelated shocks in this
paper, i.e. Λ is diagonal in all applications to follow. The covariance matrix of the
random parameters, thus, is Λ′Λ = Σθ where Σθ is always diagonal.
4.3 Lagged Dependent Variables and Estimation
Lagged dependent variables. In principle, the above models can be estimated via
a simulated maximum likelihood approach (see below). However, the presence of lagged
dependent variables on the right hand side of the regression (ei,t−1 in our case) may be
problematic since the lagged dependent variable interferes with the random parameters.
This can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.
This problem is well known for typical panels with a small number of time periods but
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large cross-sections (see e.g. Greene, 2003) and can be handled by instrumental variables
procedures in linear models. In our case, we are dealing with a long panel (many time
periods) relative to the number of cross-sectional units so that our approach is unlikely to
suffer from this “small-T” problem, just as the estimation of a simple, univariate autore-
gressive model is unlikely to yield biased estimate in a long time-series. In order to be
conservative, however, we account for possible biases arising from the presence of lagged
dependent variables by relying on a procedure proposed by Heckmann (1981).
This procedure basically treats the initial period (t = 0) as an equilibrium without effects
from lagged dependent variables. These effects only enter the regression for subsequent
periods t ≥ 1 thereby circumventing the danger of inconsistent estimates. Details on the
implementation of this procedure can be found in Appendix A.I of this paper. In the
empirical section and tables of this paper, we only show estimation results for periods
t > 0 and postpone the less interesting and less relevant results for t = 0 to the Web
Appendix of this paper.
Estimation. Due to the multiple sources of heterogeneity induced by allowing for more
than one random parameter, the likelihood function generally involves multi-dimensional
integrals which render simple estimation by maximum likelihood infeasible. We therefore
estimate our models via Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) based on 250 Halton
draws. Halton draws speed up the estimation by spreading random draws more evenly
across the support of the target distribution. More details on the simulation estimator
can be found in the Appendix A.II.
5 Do Individual Forecasters Rely on the Expected Average Forecast when
Forming Their own Expectations?
This section shows that individual forecasts are significantly affected by the expected
consensus forecast: When forecasters expect consensus forecasts to be high, they also raise
their individual expectation for the stock market, and vice versa. This result consistently
holds even when we control for a number of other determinants of expected stock returns.
16
Our main result is based on the following regression specification (in the latent variable
formulation):
e∗i,t = αi + et−1θi + x
′
i,tβ + e
∗
t−1,iγ + εi,t (6)
where θi is given by Eq. (4) above.
The difference between Eq. (3) and Eq. (6) is that we have replaced E[et] in Eq. (3)
with et−1. We use lagged consensus expectations et−1 as our proxy for expected consensus
expectations since our summary statistics in Table 2 revealed that consensus forecasts are
significantly autocorrelated. This serial correlation makes it easy for forecasters to infer
current expected consensus forecasts from past consensus forecasts.14 We run different
variants of this regressions: With and without control variables in x and with and without
lagged individual forecasts ei,t−1. Note (again) that both the intercept (α) as well as the
regression coefficient on the consensus forecast (θ) are allowed to have a random element
in the cross-section of forecasters.
Table 3 shows estimation results for these random parameters ordered logit models. The
left panel of this table shows results for U.S. forecasts whereas the right panel shows
results for German forecasts. We show three regression specifications for both countries.
The first specification regresses individual expectations on a constant and on consensus
expectations (e), the second controls for lagged individual expectation (e−1), and the third
specification includes even further control variables which, as we describe below, proxy
for the major determinants of expected stock returns and which are part of the public
information set of forecasters.
The main result from these regressions is that lagged consensus forecasts – as a proxy for
expected consensus expectations – is significantly and positively linked to individual stock
market forecasts in all specifications and across forecasts for the U.S. and German stock
markets. The effects are also of economic significance, as demonstrated by the marginal
effects discussed below.15 Therefore, individual forecasts are influenced by consensus
expectations even when controlling for lagged individual forecasts and further controls.
14We discuss an alternative approach – which leads to very similar results – in the robustness section.
15We provide similar findings for the other countries in Table A.4 in the robustness section.
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Table 3 about here
In the second specification we include lagged individual expectations. It is only natural
that (e−1) is significant since forecasters issue six month forecasts, i.e. there is a natural
degree of overlap in the forecast series. The interesting point to notice from Table 3,
though, is that consensus forecasts (e) remain significant after including lagged individual
expectation (e−1), i.e. even if forecasts overlap, forecasting relies on lagged consensus
expectations in addition to the own lagged forecasts.16
Furthermore, we find that cross-sectional heterogeneity in intercepts and the slope coeffi-
cients of consensus forecasts (e) matters quite substantially. For example, in specification
(iii) of Table 3 we find a standard deviation of the heterogeneity in the intercept of
σα = 0.824 compared to the estimate of the mean (α) of the intercept of “only” 0.512.
Therefore, the general level of optimism (or pessimism) varies considerably across fore-
casters. Similarly, we find a standard deviation for heterogeneity in the coefficient on e
of σe = 0.030, which is large compared to the mean slope coefficient estimate of 0.014.
These estimates imply that the effect of consensus expectations on individual expectations
varies considerably across forecasters and that there are several forecasters who do not
form higher-order beliefs. In Section 6, we use this last finding to specify more stringent
tests of whether it really is higher-order beliefs that are at play.
Control Variables and Expected Returns. We control for usual determinants of
expected stock returns mainly to account for time-varying risk premia in stock returns.
The control variables we apply in the full model specifications (iii) and (vi) are: Lagged
values of price-earnings ratios (PER), term spread (TS), annual industrial production
growth (IP), annual percentage changes in the CPI, six-months changes of the OECD
index of leading indicators (LD6), and the short rate (IR3M).17 We furthermore include
16We have also estimated the model without overlapping observations by using only observations from
January and July. Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
17There is a large literature on the impact of valuation ratios and macro variables on expected stock
returns. Cochrane (2005) reviews the link between stock returns and price-earnings ratios and term
spreads, Cooper and Priestley (2006) and Rangvid (2006) investigate the impact of production (or output)
on expected returns, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) show
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(lagged) aggregate stock market returns over the previous months (R−1) and the return
over the last six months (R−6) in our regressions. We include these two measures of past
returns to control for possible trend-chasing or contrarian behavior of forecasters (see e.g.
Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Dominitz and Manski, 2005, for the impact of lagged returns
on stock market expectations). Controlling for past returns seems especially important
to disentangle simple reliance on past returns from reliance on consensus expectations,
i.e. higher-order beliefs. Since forecasters are surveyed at the beginning of each month,
we use lagged values from the end of the previous month for all control variables. Also,
all control variables are country-specific here. We look at global control variables in the
robustness section and find very similar results.
Apart from the general effect of consensus expectations on individual forecasts, we doc-
ument several interesting results for our additional control variables in the full specifi-
cations (iii) and (vi). As in Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) we find that price-earnings ratios,
as a measure of stock market valuation, are positively linked to expected returns. This
seems interesting because price-earnings ratios (or price-dividend ratios) are known to
negatively forecast stock returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988;
Lamont, 1998), so that one would also expect the coefficient on PER to be negative in our
regressions. It is not, however, which suggests that forecasters in our sample do not view
high valuations as an indication of low subsequent returns. Vissing-Jørgensen (2004) finds
the same result in a sample of individual investors and argues that this positive impact
of valuation on stock market forecasts is evidence of investor overreaction. Our result is
corroborative of her finding and it seems rather interesting to detect a similar effect in a
sample of professional forecasters as well.
Measures of macroeconomic activity employed in these regressions as control variables –
industrial production growth, inflation, and leading indicators – are found to have only
weak effects that are mostly insignificant. Short-term interest rates (IR3M) are signif-
icantly negatively related to expected stock market movements, consistent with recent
evidence from predictive regressions in Ang and Bekaert (2007) or Lioui and Rangvid
that inflation impacts stock markets, and Ang and Bekaert (2007) and Lioui and Rangvid (2008) look at
the importance of short-term interest rates for future stock returns.
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(2008). Past market returns also affect stock market expectations. Short-term returns
over the past month (R−1) lead to higher return expectations whereas past returns over
intermediate horizons of six months (R−6) lower expected returns. Therefore, forecast-
ers have extrapolative expectations over the short but mean reverting expectations over
intermediate horizons.18
All in all, there is some evidence that forecasters use information contained in valuation
ratios and current macroeconomic conditions. These effects are mostly in line with earlier
evidence from the literature but we also find some new evidence regarding the impact of
price-earnings ratios on expectations of professional forecasters and the different impact
of lagged short and intermediate horizon market returns.
Economic Significance and Marginal Effects. Table 4 investigates marginal effects
for the full regression specifications (iii) and (vi) of Table 3 to evaluate the economic signif-
icance of higher-order expectations on individual forecasts. Marginal effects for a certain
determinant are computed by holding all other determinants at their unconditional mean
and by raising the explanatory variable under consideration by two standard deviations
(from their mean minus one standard deviation to their mean plus one standard devia-
tion).19 Results are shown for the three forecast categories “down”, “unchanged”, and “up”
and suggest that higher-order beliefs also matter in economic terms. The result for the
U.S. stock market, for example, suggests that a two standard deviation shock to consen-
sus forecasts increases the probability of forecasting “up” by 13.84%. This increase in the
probability of an optimistic forecast is quite large relative to the unconditional probability
of an “up” forecast of only 38.90%. Less pronounced but still significant is the increase of
6.05% for the German market relative to an unconditional “up” forecast of 62.2%. More
generally, the marginal increase in the probability of a certain forecast category is always
larger than 10% relative to the unconditional probability for all three categories and both
18In their classic papers, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990) find similar effects for a set of professional
exchange rate forecasters. In their data, forecasters also tend to predict that short-run market movements
will continue but that exchange rates mean-revert to fundamental levels over intermediate to long horizons.
Frankel and Froot have coined the expression “expectation twist” for this empirical phenomenon and our
results also point towards the existence of such a twist in equity markets.
19For the impact of individual lagged expectations (e−1), we use an increase of one category since using
standard deviations for this ordered, discrete variable does not make much sense.
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countries.
Table 4 about here
Another strong effect shown in Table 4 is due to lagged individual forecasts. An increase
in one category in the lagged forecast (e.g. et−1 increases from “unchanged” to “up”)
raises the probability of an optimistic US forecast by 23.11% for example. This points
towards a strong impact of past expectations on current forecasts and documents the
high persistence of individual forecasts as discussed above. Finally, looking at the other
control variables we find less dominant effects. The strongest effects are visible for the
term spread, the interest rates, and the past six-months market returns. The first two of
these results are in line with previous findings in the return-predictability literature since
the term spread is a classic forecasting device for future output movements and since
the interest rate is highly important for discount factors. Regarding past returns, it is
interesting to note that forecasters seem to put a relatively large weight on mean-reverting
returns although the empirical evidence on mean reversion in stock returns over horizons
of a few months is not very strong.
6 Is It Higher-Order Expectations?
A necessary condition for forecasters forming higher-order expectations is that they in-
corporate the expected average forecast of other forecasters into their own forecast: If an
individual forecaster’s forecast is not influenced by what he expects the average forecast
to be, then there is no role for higher-order expectations. We have shown that there is
strong empirical evidence that individual forecasters look towards the forecasts of others
when forming their own forecast. We have also noted that there is no reason to herd
in our dataset, as the individual forecasts are not published. Hence, we conclude that
individual forecasters do not incorporate the consensus expectation because they want to
be “close to the consensus” for reputational reasons.
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It could be, though, that forecasters rely on the consensus expectation because they
think that the average forecast summarizes otherwise dispersed private information that
is relevant for the determination of the fundamental values of stocks. In such a case,
the reliance on the average expectation might simply be standard information updating.
In essence, if forecasters receive public signals (where the consensus expectation is part
of those) and private signals, forecasters should use both when updating their beliefs.
As mentioned above, the empirical strategy we pursue to differentiate between higher-
order beliefs and standard updating of beliefs is as follows. Standard rational updating of
beliefs occurs when the forecasters believe that the other forecasters receive signals that
are different from the signal that the individual forecasters see. However, higher-order
expectations are at play when the forecasters do not necessarily believe that the signals
other forecasters receive are informative, but that the other forecasters nevertheless have
an influence on the outcomes. Hence, to evaluate whether it is higher-order expectations
that are at play, we evaluate whether forecasters look at the forecasts of others per se, i.e.
look at the expected consensus expectation regardless of whether they think the consensus
forecast summarizes useful new information that is otherwise not publicly available or
not.20
The first step in this regard is that we split the sample of forecasters into two groups:21
Those forecasters who are likely to be paid more if they do better than the market and
those forecasters who are not. Our prior here is that those forecasters who are paid more if
they outperform relative to a market trend look more towards the average expectation, as
these forecasters are more interested in where the market is expected to move (and, hence,
where the others expect the market to move), regardless of whether the average forecast
contains informative signals about the fundamental value of stocks or not. Again, we stress
that the forecasters have no reputational reason for doing so as their individual forecasts
are not published. Hence, if they incorporate the consensus into their own forecasts, they
20A simple check of whether rational updating is a likely explanation of our finding can also be conducted
by regressing future stock returns on current consensus expectations, since a rational updating makes sense
only if consensus beliefs are actually informative for future stock returns. Running such regressions (not
reported for the sake of brevity) in a variety of different specifications does not suggest that consensus
expectations forecast future stock returns in a way consistent with rational updating. If anything, our
results indicate that consensus expectations are negatively related to future stock returns.
21We are grateful to Annette Vissing-Jørgensen for suggesting this way of testing for higher-order
expectations.
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do so because they believe that the consensus affects the outcome, regardless of whether
it contains new information or not.
The second step is to investigate whether young forecasters rely more on the consensus
expectation. Based on the results of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Hong, Kubik, and
Solomon (2000) that young market participants tend to herd due to career concerns and
the result in Greenwood and Nagel (2009) that young mutual fund managers were “riding
the technology bubble“ as they exhibited trend-chasing behavior in their investments
in technology stocks, we hypothesize that young forecasters might be more prone to
forming higher-order expectations. We remember also here that young forecasters have
no incentive to herd in our data.
6.1 Relative Forecasters
As just mentioned, we divide the sample of forecasters into two groups: One group con-
taining forecasters who are expected to be paid more if they outperform relative to a
benchmark and another group containing forecasters who are more likely paid in terms
of absolute success. In the first group we mainly collect portfolio managers and in the
second group we mainly collect treasurers and CFO’s from industrial firms. The two
groups account for roughly 25% (“relative” forecasters) and 30% (“absolute” forecasters),
respectively.
Our basic reasoning is as follows: A portfolio manager is often evaluated in terms of
outperformance in relation to a certain benchmark. For instance, if an index a portfolio
manager is following is down ten percent, but the portfolio manager is down only five
percent, the portfolio manager has outperformed the benchmark and has in this sense
been successful. Most likely, his pay will also be influenced by his success. Hence, a
portfolio manager has a reputational reason for following the benchmark closely, if his
outperformance relative to the trend can be observed.
In earlier studies, portfolio managers have been shown to herd, i.e. bias their forecast
towards the consensus. If it is also portfolio managers who in this dataset (where they
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have no incentive to herd) rely particularly much on the consensus expectation, this would
indicate that they overweight public information, i.e. form higher-order expectations.
We want to test this assertion. To do so, we augment our baseline specification by two
interaction variables: One where we interact the lagged consensus forecast with a dummy
variable (drel) equal to one if a forecaster has a job where it is likely that he is paid in
terms of outperformance in relation to a market trend (and zero otherwise) and another
interaction variable that interacts the lagged consensus forecast with a dummy equal to
one if a forecaster works in a position where it is important whether the firm does well in
an absolute sense.
Table 5 shows the results.22 We find that the coefficients to the e × drel interaction
term are consistently estimated to be positive and significant whereas the coefficients to
the e × dabs interaction term are consistently estimated to be negative. This indicates
that those forecasters who are likely to be paid in terms of outperformance relative to
a market trend incorporate consensus expectations to an even larger extent, compared
to the reference group which contains forecasters not assigned to any of our two other
groups, whereas those forecasters who are not paid in terms of relative outperformance
care less about the average expectations.
In Panel B, we show the marginal effects. The marginal effects for the U.S. are such
that being in the group of relative forecasters increases the impact of consensus beliefs on
individual beliefs by about 10% (2.13% increase relative to the overall effect of 20.52%)
whereas being in the group of absolute forecasters decreases the impact of consensus beliefs
by about 20% (decrease of 4.13% relative to the overall effect of 20.52%). The effect for
the German market forecasts are about 15% (relative group) and -30% (absolute group)
relative to the general impact of consensus expectations on individual expectations. These
effects clearly seem economically significant, in particular because it is likely that we are
underestimating the economic significance of being in the relative or absolute group of
forecasters, since we cannot perfectly identify relative and absolute forecasters.
22We do not show estimation results for the control variables here to save space and only indicate in
the row “Controls” whether control variables are included or not.
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6.2 Young Forecasters
Several papers (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Green-
wood and Nagel, 2009) argue that younger and less experienced financial market partic-
ipants are more prone to consensus-orientated behavior.23 These papers generally find
that young market participants follow the trades of other traders. The question we ask
here is whether young market participants also rely more on what they expect the other
forecasters to forecast per se. The latter case is higher-order expectations. The hypothe-
sis we test here is whether those forecasters (the young) who have been shown to simply
follow the herd when trading display the same characteristics when they make forecasts,
taking into account that the forecasters in the survey we use here do not have to fear any
consequences for their reputation from the forecasts they submit to the survey.
Table 6 shows estimates of regressions where we augment our baseline specification by
an interaction variable of the lagged consensus forecast with the age of forecaster i. For
symmetry, we also include an interaction variable of lagged individual expectations and
age. In this specification we allow cross-sectional randomness in the intercept and the
coefficients on consensus forecasts and the interaction term (e × age). We use age as a
broad encompassing proxy of experience although we have direct evidence on job-related
experience in financial markets. Experience and age are highly correlated (> 80%) and
our results are not affected by using experience instead of age.
Estimates for both countries show a negative coefficient on the interaction term in Panel
A of Table 6, indicating that older and more experienced forecasters care significantly
less about consensus expectations. Higher-order beliefs thus do play a greater role for
young and inexperienced forecasters. Moreover, we find that including age reduces the
cross-sectional variation in intercepts and slope coefficients considerably (especially in σe),
23Corroborating this, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Menkhoff, Schmidt, and Brozynski (2006) show
that younger fund managers in the U.S. and Germany, respectively, tend to engage more in herding than
their older peers.
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which suggests that age (or experience) captures a large share of cross-sectional differences
between forecasters.
Table 6 about here
Looking at marginal effects in Panel B of that table, we also find that including age leads
to a much more pronounced effect of consensus expectations on individual expectations
and that being older (and more experienced) significantly reduces the formation of higher-
order expectations.
7 Robustness
In this section, we evaluate along different dimensions whether our results are robust.
First, we show that those forecasters whose forecast deviated more from the consensus
forecast of the previous period tend to incorporate the expected consensus forecast even
more when forming their own forecast for the current period. Next, we show that our
overall results are not influenced by the general state of the market. Finally, we find that
our results hold for the remaining countries in our sample as well as for using other control
variables or proxies for the expected consensus forecast.
7.1 Do Individuals Adjust to Consensus Beliefs?
We have shown that forecasters take into account the expected average of individual
forecasts. This is a necessary condition for higher-order expectations. Another way to
illustrate that investor really adapt to the consensus expectation is to evaluate whether
those forecaster’s whose forecast was “far away” from the consensus forecast last period
adapt more to the consensus than do those forecasters whose forecast was not that far
away from the consensus. To do this, we run regressions of individual expectations on
the difference between lagged individual expectations and consensus beliefs. We call this
variable DEVi,t = ei,t−1 − et−1. The results are shown in Table 7.
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The effect of DEV on own forecasts is consistently estimated to be negative. This makes
intuitive sense when interpreted within a higher-order setting: The larger is DEV , the
more optimistic was the forecaster last period in comparison with the consensus expecta-
tion. The forecaster takes this into account, and adjusts his expectation for this period
downwards. This is another strong finding revealing that the average forecast matters for
individual forecasts.
7.2 Dependence on Market States
We investigate whether different states of the market such as bull versus bear markets and
high versus low volatility have an impact on the degree to which forecasters form higher-
order beliefs. To this end, we split our sample into sub-samples of up and down markets
and into sub-samples of high and low volatility and re-estimate our baseline models on
these samples. We consider both trends and volatility in returns as well as in consensus
expectations. Results for these exercises are shown in Table 8.
Bull versus Bear Markets. We first look at sub-samples formed on lagged six-months
market returns. Bull markets correspond to months where returns over the last six months
are positive whereas bear markets are defined to have negative past returns (over the
last six months).24 We generally do not find different effects regarding the formation of
higher-order beliefs during bull and bear markets. Higher-order beliefs thus do not seem
to depend on the direction of the general market.
Table 8 about here
24Using three or twelve months instead does not change our qualitative findings.
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Market Volatility. We form two sub-samples depending on high versus low market
return volatility (proxied for by lagged six-months absolute returns of the aggregate stock
market). Looking at the results in Table 8 we find that the coefficient estimate of consensus
expectations is almost twice as large for the low market volatility sub-sample compared to
the high volatility sub-sample for both the U.S. and Germany. That means that forecasters
tend to rely more on consensus expectations when the stock market is calm.
Times of Optimism and Pessimism. The charts in Figure 1 indicate two major
regimes in our sample: the period from 1991 to 2001 when consensus expectations were
rising and a pessimistic regime from 2002 to 2008 when expectations were decreasing.
We therefore split the sample into these two sub-samples and re-estimate our base re-
gression for these two regimes. We find that higher-order beliefs matter more in times of
upward trending consensus expectations (and matter less in times of downward trends in
consensus expectations. In fact, the coefficient on consensus expectations is negative for
the pessimistic regime (but insignificant) but positive and highly significant for the opti-
mistic regime. A potential explanation is that the distortions of asset prices resulting from
higher-order beliefs (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2009) are higher when the consensus
estimate is rising since it is relatively easier to buy than to sell short.
Volatility in Consensus Expectations. Finally, we split our full sample into two sub-
samples depending on whether the lagged absolute change in consensus forecasts is above
or below the median value of absolute consensus changes. The resulting sub-samples are
used to investigate whether higher-order beliefs are more important when the volatility
in consensus expectations is low or high. Our results suggest that higher-order beliefs
are more important in times of large changes in consensus forecasts. Individuals tend to
rely more on consensus forecasts when up- or downward revisions of consensus beliefs are
large. This result seems intuitive since the information contained in consensus forecasts
should be more valuable when consensus expectations change rapidly. It is interesting to
note, however, that the volatility of consensus expectations has an opposite effect on the
formation of higher-order beliefs compared with the effect of market volatility documented
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above. It is thus important to differentiate between the two concepts.
7.3 Results for Other Countries
We show results of our baseline regression specification for the U.K., France, Italy, and
Japan – i.e. all other countries with available data – in Table A.4 in the Webappendix.
It can be inferred that our main result is stable across these other countries as well.
The coefficient estimate of e is significantly positive and highly significant for all four
countries. We also find very similar results (compared to the benchmark countries U.S.
and Germany) for the impact of lagged individual expectations and the other control
variables. Again, the price-earnings ratio is significantly positive (similar to the findings
in Vissing-Jørgensen (2004)), the term spread tends to be significantly negative, the short
rate (IR3M) is significantly negative, and we find a positive impact of lagged short-term
returns and a negative impact of lagged six-months returns (except for Japan).
7.4 Global Control Variables
We have also estimated our regressions with additional global control variables. More
specifically, we have included not only country-specific determinants (such as the German
price-earnings ratio for the German market for example) but also global determinants,
such as global money market interest rates, output movements, inflation etc. This proce-
dure seems to make sense since stock markets are highly integrated nowadays (Bekaert,
Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel, 2008). We find (not reported for the sake of brevity) that
the inclusion of global controls does not alter our main findings about higher-order ex-
pectations. Regarding the effect of global controls on individual expectations, we find
that global short rates are significant in many countries even when including jointly with
country-specific rates and that global price-earnings ratios are sometimes negative when
included jointly with national price earnings ratios (although not when included alone).
Results for other controls are significant for some countries but there is no clear and con-
sistent pattern. We therefore conclude that our results on higher-order expectations are
not due to omitted global control variables.
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7.5 Expected Consensus Forecasts
Finally, we have also experimented with a different proxy for forecasters’ expectations
about consensus forecasts. While the results documented in this paper are based on
using lagged consensus forecasts as a proxy for expected consensus forecasts, we have also
used time-series forecasts of consensus forecasts as proxies. More specifically, we have
computed forecasts of consensus expectations using simple ARMA(1,1)-models. These
forecasts are then used as proxies for expected consensus beliefs, i.e. Et−1[et] is used
instead of et−1 in our regressions. Our (unreported) results show that using forecasted
instead of lagged consensus stock market expectations yields extremely similar results.
This result seems reasonable since consensus forecasts are significantly autocorrelated so
that the information contained in lagged and predicted consensus expectations is nearly
identical.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that individual forecasters tend to be more optimistic for the stock market
when they can reasonably assume the general consensus opinion to be optimistic and vice
versa. This finding is directly in line with the classic beauty-contest argument by Keynes
(1936).
While recent contributions (Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006; Bacchetta and van Wincoop,
2006, 2009; Nimark, 2007; Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer, 2009; Makarov and Rytchkov,
2008) have examined the theoretical implications of these higher-order beliefs for asset
pricing, we are the first to present empirical tests of this kind of expectation formation and
learning in financial markets. Using data from a large and reliable survey of professional
forecasters, we find strong evidence that the average of expected forecasts matters much for
individual forecasters’ expectations about future stock market movements. This finding is
robust when controlling for a number of factors known from earlier research to be related to
expected stock returns and it is robust when controlling for lagged individual stock market
expectations. We also find that young forecasters and forecasters who are likely to be paid
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more if they outperform the market tend to rely more on the consensus expectations, which
we interpret as evidence that forecasters form higher-order expectations.
An alternative way to test for higher-order expectations would be to look directly at asset
prices. Indeed, if investors form higher-order expectations, a wedge will arise between the
fundamental price of an assets and its market price (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2009).
Also, higher-order expectations lead to an excessive reaction of asset prices to public
information (Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006). Even if both of these implications of higher-
order expectations would be interesting to study, they also both require the formulation
and estimation of a model giving the “fundamental” price of assets, something that is
inherently difficult to specify and implement. For this reason also, we have looked at the
formation of expectations among professional forecasters and leave the test of higher-order
expectations using market prices to future work.
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Appendix
A.I Lagged Dependent Variables
This section of the Appendix illustrates the procedure proposed by Heckmann (1981)
which we adapt to our panel setting. We directly consider the case of multiple random
parameters and several lagged endogenous variables (we will use lagged dependent vari-
ables and interactions thereof with other explanatory variables in our applications).
To this end, consider the following panel regression (which we write in terms of the latent
quantitative forecast e∗ to ease notational burden)
e∗i,t = z
′
i,tθi + x
′
i,tβi + y
′
t−1,iγ + εi,t (7)
for t = 0, 1, . . . , Ti and i = 1, . . . , N . In this general notation, the vector z collects all
explanatory variables (including the intercept) that are allowed to have random param-
eters (the consensus expectation and interactions of consensus expectations with other
variables in our case) and the parameter vector θ is given by
θi = θ + Λvi
as in the main text in section 4.2. Furthermore, the vector x collects control variables with
fixed slope coefficients and y denotes the vector related to lagged dependent variables (e.g.
the lagged dependent variable e∗i,t−1 itself and interaction terms). β and γ are parameter
vectors and εi,t is a normally distributed error term.
Heckman’s general procedure treats the first period t = 0 as an equilibrium without effects
of lagged dependent variables. In t = 0 we therefore have
e∗i,0 = z
′
i,0τi + x
′
i,0δi + εi,0 (8)
where the vector of random parameters now reads
τi = τ + Ωvi
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so that the mean parameters (τ) and standard deviations (Ω) are different from the case
t > 0. Note, however, that the random vector vi is the same across all time periods t.
For periods t > 0 we have the same specification as shown in Eq. (7) above. Now, let ζ0t
denote a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if t = 0 and let ζt = 1− ζ0t , then the
encompassing model is
e∗i,t = ζ
0
t z
′
i,0τi + ζtz
′
i,tθi + ζ
0
t x
′
i,0δi + ζtx
′
i,tβi + ζty
′
t−1,iγ + εi,t (9)
which can be estimated via Simulated Maximum Likelihood, as we will briefly discuss
next.25
A.II Details on the Simulated Maximum Likelihood Procedure
Denote the likelihood of observing a qualitative forecast ei,t of forecaster i in month t as
P (ei,t|wi,t,Θ) = g(wi,t,Θ) (10)
where wi,t contains all explanatory variables on the right-hand side of our regressions and
Θ collects all parameters. The function g(wi,t,Θ) is short-cut for the ordered logit model
discussed in section 4.1 above. We suppress the differentiation into period t = 0 and t > 0
(see above) to ease the notational burden.
Remember that we employ random parameters of the form E[θi] = θ such that θi = θ+Λvi
and let V[θi] = Σθ be a diagonal covariance matrix, i.e. we have uncorrelated random
parameters. θ contains both the constant as well as all other random slope coefficients.
The true log-likelihood is logL =
∑
i logLi where Li is the likelihood contribution of fore-
caster i to the total likelihood. Conditional on the random vector vi it is straightforward
to find this likelihood contribution:
Li|vi =
Ti∏
t=1
g(wi,t,Θ) (11)
25Note that the initial period t = 0 is different across forecasters since we have an unbalanced panel
where some forecasters enter the sample later than December 1991. Therefore, δ is identified even if
determinants in xi,0 are not forecaster-specific, i.e. xi,t = xt.
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for t = 1, ..., Ti because we have an unbalanced panel. Since vi is not observable, one has to
integrate it out of the likelihood function by taking the expectation over the distribution
of vi which yields a multivariate integral (the dimension of which depends on the number
of random elements in θi and, in turn, vi)
Li = Evi [Li|vi] =
∫
Rvi
g(vi)
(
Ti∏
t=1
g(wi,t,Θ)
)
dvi (12)
which generally cannot be solved for analytically. In the simulated maximum likelihood
estimation one thus replaces the unknown integral by an approximate integral obtained
via Monte Carlo Simulation. This approximation can be done by drawing a large number
of random vectors vi,s which can in turn be used to replace the analytically intractable
expression in Eq. (12) above
Evi [Li|vi] '
1
S
S∑
s=1
Li|vi,s (13)
i.e. the average of the likelihood function conditional on vi where the unobserved vector
vi is replaced by the simulated (and thus observable) random vector vi,s. The total log
likelihood is then simply the sum over all forecasters i, i.e. logL =
∑
i logLi as mentioned
above.
For estimation purposes, it is necessary to choose a large number of simulations S to
obtain stable approximations. Choosing a large S, however, also slows down computation,
especially in a non-linear ordered choice panel setting as encountered here. We therefore
use 250 Halton draws to approximate the unknown expectation Evi [Li|vi]. Halton draws
can speed up computational performance considerably by spreading random numbers
more effectively over the unit interval than standard random number generators so that
the number of draws necessary can be reduced by as much as 90% (see Train, 1999).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Individual forecasters
mean median max min std
Gender 0.94 1 1 0 0.24
Age 46.27 46 70 27 8.63
Job experience
General 23.52 22 51 5 9.82
Financial Markets 20.48 19 50 5 9.19
Economics education 0.73 1 1 0 0.49
University degree 0.77 1 1 0 0.42
Doctoral degree 0.09 0 1 0 0.29
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for characteristics of roughly 450 individual
forecasters in our sample. Gender is a dummy variable equal to one for a male forecaster.
“Age”and“job experience”are measured in years and are reported as of 2008 to make fore-
casters comparable. “Economics education”, “University degree”, and “PhD” are dummy
variables indicating a degree in economics, finance, or business, a degree granted from a
university, or the completion of a doctoral degree, respectively.
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Figure 1: Consensus forecasts
Notes: The figure shows time-series plots of monthly consensus stock market forecasts
for the U.S., Germany, U.K., France, Italy, and Japan. The sample period is 12/1991 –
10/2008.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Consensus stock market forecasts
US GER UK FR IT JP
mean 0.17 0.50 0.25 0.48 0.39 0.42
median 0.17 0.53 0.23 0.52 0.41 0.45
max 0.63 0.82 0.65 0.75 0.73 0.75
min -0.52 0.10 -0.09 0.00 -0.14 -0.08
std 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.20
skew -0.22 -0.37 0.14 -0.73 -0.55 -0.50
kurt 2.13 2.62 1.78 3.00 2.84 2.38
ρ−1 0.94 0.83 0.93 0.86 0.90 0.89
ADF -2.57 -4.12 -2.83 -3.62 -3.36 -3.40
(0.10) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Levin, Lin, Chu t -4.43 (0.00)
Im, Pesaran, Shin W -5.08 (0.00)
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for consensus stock market forecasts. ρ−1
denotes first order autocorrelations and ADF denotes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
The panel unit-root test of Levin, Lin, and Chu tests for a common unit root, whereas
the test by Im, Pesaran, and Shin tests for individual unit-roots in a panel. P-values are
in parentheses. The sample period is 12/1991 – 10/2008 on a monthly frequency.
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Table 3: Random parameters panel ordered logit models – Results for t > 0
U.S. Germany
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
const. 0.923 -0.456 0.512 1.087 -0.175 -0.006
[2.76] [-2.97] [4.25] [13.02] [-2.73] [-0.09]
e 0.022 0.009 0.014 0.026 0.015 0.012
[16.35] [13.30] [11.94] [18.29] [12.28] [11.31]
e−1 1.675 1.280 1.357 1.359
[23.64] [17.38] [21.05] [18.41]
PER 0.010 0.010
[3.88] [1.11]
TS -0.064 -0.052
[-3.71] [-3.79]
IP -0.004 -0.007
[-0.60] [-1.65]
CPI -0.033 -0.025
[-1.60] [-0.76]
LD6 0.007 0.014
[1.26] [3.19]
IR3M -0.097 -0.007
[-4.68] [-0.36]
R−1 0.016 0.008
[4.08] [2.84]
R−6 -0.010 -0.009
[-4.84] [-6.87]
σ (const.) 0.071 0.821 0.824 1.081 0.737 0.746
σ (e) 0.017 0.027 0.030 0.014 0.019 0.023
Log L -31.47 -28.48 -28.33 -27.96 -26.13 -25.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.18
obs 34,195 34,195 34,195 34,798 34,798 34,798
Notes: This tables shows regressions of individual stock market forecasts (e) on different
sets of determinants for the U.S. and German stock market. “e” denotes the (lagged)
consensus forecast of all forecasters, e−1 is the lagged individual forecast. PER denotes
the aggregate market’s price-earnings ratio, TS the term spread, IP the annual growth
in industrial production, CPI the annual inflation rate. LD6 denotes the OECD’s Index
of leading indicators (6-month change), IR3M denotes the three months money market
interest rate, R−1 and R−6 are lagged market returns over the last month and last six
months, respectively. All determinants are measured at the end of the month just prior
to the forecast. σ()˙ denotes the standard deviation of a random parameter, Log L reports
the log likelihood (scaled by 10−4). Estimates are for t > 0. Numbers in brackets show
t-statistics.
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Table 4: Marginal effects
U.S. Germany
down unch. up down unch. up
e -9.58 -4.26 13.84 -2.54 -3.67 6.50
e−1 -15.87 -7.24 23.11 -10.57 -14.81 25.38
PER -1.11 -0.51 1.62 -0.52 -0.74 1.33
TS 2.24 1.01 -3.25 0.94 1.35 -2.29
IP 0.34 0.17 -0.45 0.35 0.49 -0.91
CPI 0.63 0.29 -0.91 0.42 0.59 -1.01
LD6 -0.61 -0.30 0.91 -1.06 -1.54 2.60
IR3M 3.97 1.80 -5.77 0.20 0.26 -0.43
R−1 -1.65 -0.74 2.40 -0.76 -1.01 1.89
R−6 2.04 1.02 -3.07 2.11 3.01 -5.12
P (ei = j) 23.7 37.3 38.9 13.4 24.2 62.2
Notes: Marginal effects of explanatory variables corresponding to specification (iii) and
(vi) in Table 3 for the three forecasting categories “down”, “unchanged”, and “up”. The
last row shows unconditional probabilities of forecasts being in one of the three categroies.
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Table 5: Relative versus absolute evaluation
Panel A: Coefficient estimates
U.S. Germany
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
const. 0.174 0.310 0.544 0.009 -0.056 -0.142
[3.13] [3.42] [4.63] [-0.13] [-0.87] [-1.73]
e 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.014
[13.29] [10.04] [9.76] [11.15] [9.32] [7.70]
e× drel 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
[3.22] [2.89] [3.01] [3.41] [3.30] [2.61]
e× dabs -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
[-3.75] [-4.12] [-3.38] [-4.86] [-3.74] [-4.51]
e−1 1.160 1.154 1.199 1.304
[18.09] [17.91] [15.66] [14.20]
e−1 × drel -0.056 -0.051 -0.083 -0.052
[-3.08] [-3.22] [-1.99] [-1.56]
e−1 × dabs 0.144 0.137 0.111 0.156
[6.32] [7.20] [2.71] [3.48]
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
σ (const.) 0.643 0.939 0.926 0.712 0.573 0.650
σ (e) 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.009
σ (e ×drel) 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.007
σ (e ×dabs) 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.006
Log L -30.16 -28.71 -28.03 -29.01 -25.12 -24.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.22
obs 34,195 34,195 34,195 34,798 34,798 34,798
Panel B: Marginal effects for specification (iii) and (vi)
U.S. Germany
down unch. up down unch. up
e -11.34 -9.18 20.52 -3.52 -6.44 9.96
e × drel -1.32 -0.81 2.13 -0.19 -1.04 1.43
e × dabs 2.70 1.62 -4.32 2.02 0.92 -2.94
e−1 -14.25 -11.03 25.28 -8.11 -21.02 29.13
e−1× drel 0.64 0.49 -1.13 0.32 0.84 -1.16
e−1× dabs -1.69 -1.31 3.00 -0.97 -2.51 3.48
P (ei = j) 23.70 37.30 38.90 13.40 24.20 62.20
Notes: The setup in Panel A is the same as in Table 3 but we also include interaction
terms of consensus expectations e and lagged individual expectations e−1 with two dummy
variables indicating forecasters which are evaluated more in terms of relative performance
(drel) and absolute performance (dabs), respectively. Panel B shows marginal effects for
specifications (iii) and (vi). 44
Table 6: Experienced versus inexperienced forecasters
Panel A: Coefficient estimates
U.S. Germany
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
const. 0.165 -0.293 0.561 0.017 0.086 0.042
[1.78] [-2.56] [3.76] [2.12] [2.18] [0.63]
e 0.028 0.021 0.020 0.042 0.028 0.023
[4.89] [5.99] [5.74] [13.21] [9.97] [10.76]
e × age -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026
[-2.74] [-2.48] [-2.52] [-6.88] [-6.32] [-5.56]
e−1 0.965 0.932 0.888 0.810
[15.54] [17.62] [16.01] [12.11]
e−1× age 0.308 0.434 0.638 0.798
[4.16] [4.02] [7.39] [7.42]
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
σ (const.) 0.901 0.880 0.898 0.598 0.542 0.719
σ (e) 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.010 0.008
σ (e × age) 0.029 0.026 0.033 0.011 0.012 0.007
Log L -30.78 -28.99 -28.10 -29.79 -25.68 -25.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.21
obs 34,195 34,195 34,195 34,798 34,798 34,798
Panel B: Marginal effects for specification (iii) and (vi)
U.S. Germany
down unch. up down unch. up
e -13.31 -10.65 23.96 -5.09 -13.00 18.09
e × age 4.62 0.99 -5.61 2.60 6.83 -9.43
e−1 -11.38 -9.22 20.60 -5.06 -13.10 18.16
e−1× age -4.35 -3.53 7.88 -4.62 -11.97 16.59
P (ei = j) 23.70 37.30 38.90 13.40 24.20 62.20
Notes: The setup in Panel A is the same as in Table 3 with an additional random param-
eter – the interaction of e and e−1 with forecasters’ age. Panel B shows marginal effects
for specifications (iii) and (vi).
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Table 7: Impact of individual deviations from lagged consensus beliefs
U.S. Germany
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
const. 0.301 -0.392 -0.721 0.975 0.372 0.110
[1.88] [-1.66] [-3.23] [6.36] [2.99] [1.02]
DEV -2.205 -1.782 -1.567 -1.430 -1.195 -1.203
[-17.54] [-13.79] [-12.39] [-11.02] [-8.33] [-9.451]
e−1 2.883 2.792 2.555 2.598
[16.65] [17.38] [18.23] [18.78]
Controls NO NO YES NO NO NO
σ (const.) 0.861 0.820 0.758 0.730 0.471 0.405
σ (DEV) 0.652 0.791 0.714 0.828 0.662 0.607
Log L -32.49 -30.23 -29.61 -29.08 -25.45 -24.79
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.19
obs 34,195 34,195 34,195 34,798 34,798 34,798
Panel B: Marginal effects for specification (iii) and (vi)
U.S. forecasters German forecasters
down unch. up down unch. up
DEV 14.33 10.32 -24.65 5.21 13.84 -19.05
e−1 -15.40 -11.79 27.19 -9.21 -17.04 26.25
P (ei = j) 23.70 37.30 38.90 13.40 24.20 62.20
Notes: The setup is the same as in Table 3 above but here we use DEV (the difference
between lagged individual forecast and consensus forecast) as explanatory variable instead
of lagged consensus forecasts e. We do not report coefficient estimates for the control
variables to save space but indicate (in row “Controls”) whether or not they are included.
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Web Appendix to accompany
Higher-order beliefs among professional stock market
forecasters: Some first empirical tests
Jesper Rangvid Maik Schmeling Andreas Schrimpf
Table A.1: Correlation coefficients: Consensus stock market forecasts
US GER UK FR IT JP
US 1.00 0.46 0.88 0.33 0.62 0.29
GER 1.00 0.67 0.92 0.74 0.35
UK 1.00 0.57 0.71 0.34
FR 1.00 0.78 0.33
IT 1.00 0.49
JP 1.00
Notes: This table shows simple correlation coefficients for the consensus series of stock
market forecasts.
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Table A.2: Transition probabilities: Individual stock market forecasts
USA Germany
down unch. up down unch. up
down 0.62 0.26 0.12 down 0.58 0.22 0.21
unch. 0.16 0.60 0.24 unch. 0.11 0.51 0.38
up 0.07 0.22 0.71 up 0.05 0.14 0.81
UK France
down unch. up down unch. up
down 0.56 0.31 0.13 down 0.55 0.24 0.21
unch. 0.11 0.67 0.22 unch. 0.11 0.55 0.35
up 0.06 0.24 0.70 up 0.04 0.17 0.79
Italy Japan
down unch. up down unch. up
down 0.53 0.28 0.18 down 0.51 0.30 0.18
unch. 0.11 0.58 0.31 unch. 0.12 0.56 0.33
up 0.05 0.17 0.78 up 0.05 0.20 0.75
Notes: This table shows transition probabilities for individual stock market forecasts.
The transition is from a row to a column element, e.g. 0.26 in the upper left panel “USA”
means that there is a 26% probability that a forecaster revises his expectation from“down”
in period t to “unchanged” in period t+ 1.
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Table A.3: Random parameters panel ordered logit models – Estimates for t = 0
U.S. Germany
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
const. 0.451 0.341 0.409 1.087 -0.175 0.018
[1.15] [0.38] [1.25] [13.02] [-2.73] [1.38]
e 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.026 0.015 -0.009
[2.01] [1.40] [1.89] [13.29] [12.28] [-1.35]
PER -0.032 -0.069
[-0.94] [-0.45]
TS 0.246 -0.029
[1.22] [-1.02]
IP 0.111 -0.029
[1.68] [-1.02]
CPI -0.369 0.470
[-1.59] [2.61]
LD6 -0.128 0.024
[-2.72] [0.93]
IR3M 0.020 -0.294
[0.12] [-1.92]
R−1 0.134 0.084
[4.24] [4.41]
R−6 -0.024 -0.028
[-1.59] [-2.47]
σ (const.) 0.432 0.176 0.601 0.552 0.222 0.197
σ (e) 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.009
Notes: This table shows coefficient estimates of the initial period t = 0 for the regressions
shown in Table 3.
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Table A.4: Higher-order expectations for other countries
UK FR IT JP
const. 0.680 -0.188 -0.060 0.265
[5.25] [-1.67] [-0.84] [5.24]
e 0.031 0.035 0.021 0.010
[9.12] [13.85] [7.58] [4.75]
e−1 0.984 0.868 1.010 1.020
[16.73] [14.13] [16.37] [18.05]
PER 0.004 0.015 0.013 0.004
[0.86] [3.18] [3.81] [3.31]
TS -0.017 -0.029 -0.066 -0.072
[-1.88] [-1.96] [-2.92] [-2.97]
IP -0.034 -0.007 -0.002 0.003
[-3.84] [-1.30] [-0.32] [0.96]
CPI 0.015 0.013 0.078 0.035
[0.76] [0.56] [3.32] [2.37]
LD6 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.028
[2.13] [2.13] [2.25] [6.88]
IR3M -0.054 0.001 -0.044 -0.028
[-3.75] [0.12] [-4.21] [-2.72]
R−1 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.016
[4.35] [3.30] [3.72] [6.51]
R−6 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 0.005
[-6.96] [-5.38] [-5.80] [3.44]
σ (const.) 0.746 0.796 0.788 0.690
σ (e) 0.018 0.009 0.021 0.005
Log L -28.08 -24.31 -23.72 -25.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.21
obs 35,122 33,615 32,453 34,180
Notes: This table shows results analogous to specifications (iii) and (vi) in Table 3 for the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan.
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